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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

CARL STURDAVANT,
Plaitntiff and Appellant:'

-vs.-

Case No. 8132

KENNE'TH COVINGTON,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

S.TATEMENT OF THE c·ASE
This action arose out of an automobile accident which
occurred on the 17th day of November, 1951 on U. S.
Highway 91 just east of the intersection of Center Street
in American Fork, Utah. Both vehicles were traveling
in an easterly direction toward Provo. Plaintiff was proceeding immediately ahead of the defendant and the accident was precipitated when the plaintiff, having stopped
for a red light, started up and proceeded across, and be·yond the intersection directly ahead for a total distance
of about 130 feet when he suddenly jammed on his brakes
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to stop. Defendant, following, was unable to avoid a rear
end collision.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages and defendant counterclaimed. The action was tried to a jury in the
Fourth Judicial District. The jury was instructed in
regard to the issues of claimed negligence and contributory negligence as ap·plied to the claims of both parties
(R. 211). Verdicts were returned in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action, and
in favor of the plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim,
no cause of action. In so doing the jury apparently
found that both drivers v.rere guilty of some negligence
which proximately contributed to the collision, at least
it would seem this is the only logical conclusion to be
drawn since defendant's requested instruction as to
unavoidable accident (R. 37) was not given by the court
to the jury.
On this ap·p·eal plaintiff and appellant contends under Point I that defendant was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law which p·roximately caused the collision and
under Point II that as a matter of law plaintiff was not
guilty of negligence or contributory negligence.
In other words, ap·pellant claims he was entitled to
a directed verdict. Therefore, if the evidence was such
as to pres.ent a question of fact for the jury on the issue
of plaintiff's negligence as either the sole or a c·ontributing cause of the collision the appellant has no grounds
for complaint.
In passing on the question raised, it is fundamental
that the evidence and all reasonable inferences there2
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from must be construed in the light most favorable toward sustaining the verdicts. Gibbs v. Blue Cab (Utah)
249 Pac. ( 2) 213 and others. We do not feel that appellant
has so stated the factual situation and evidence in this
matter and therefore we prefer to make our own statement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and appellant, Carl Sturdavant, was traveling through Utah on his way to Banning, California, from
his employment as an engineer in Anchorage, Alaska.
He was driving a 1947 Cadillac automobile and was alone
in his automobile at the time of the accident (R. 73).
Defendant and respondent, Kenneth Covington, likewise
traveling alone, was on his way to work at the Geneva
Steel Plant in Utah County from his home in Lehi, Utah,
in his 1948 Chevrolet automobile at the time of the accident. The accident occurred a short distance east of the
intersection of U. S. Highway 91 (Main Street) and
Center Street in American Fork, Utah at about 3:00
P.M. (R. 93). The road was dry; the weather clear.
T·he plaintiff's version of the accident in substance
is that he entered the City of American Fork traveling
generally east on U.S. 91 and stopped for the semaphore
light at Center Street and U.S. 91 in response to a red
light in the lane of traffic nearest the curb. As the light
turned to green, a dog entered the street directly in front
of his automobile and p-roceeded to run along directly
in front of him as he moved across and beyond the intersection. After his vehicle had traveled approximately 130
feet in this manner the dog came to a dead stop about

3
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two or three feet in front of him. He then immediately
and suddenly stop·p·ed his automobile (R. 77, 107). He
admitted that he did not signal his intention to stop (R.
110). From the time he started up from a stopped position until he suddenly stopped for the dog, 130 feet across
and beyond the intersection, he was anticipating "all the
time" that he m.ight have to stop for the d:og (R. 110).
He was totally unaware of defendant's automobile which
was immediately behind him, although he claimed to have
used two rear view mirrors (R. 108). He accelerated his
car continuously from the time he started up until the
time he suddenly stopp·ed (R. 109, 110). His car may have
rolled forward free of brakes after the impact (R. 111).
As to the events leading up to the accident, defendant
Kenneth Covington testified in substance that he first
noticed the Cadillac automobile about six blocks west of
the intersection in question when that vehicle passed him
in the lane next to the center line. He followed the Cadillac at a distance of about 100 feet and just before the
Cadillac stopped for the red light, it crossed into the
lane nearest the curb in front of defendant. Defendant
slowed up to stop for the light also, and as he pulled
.up immediately behind plaintiff the light changed to
green. Both vehicles then commenced to move across the
intersection with the defendant following at a distance
of about 16 feet. Defendant did not see the dog plaintiff
testified to, and if it was there it was outside the range
of his vision. About 50 feet beyond the east cross\valk
of the intersection the plaintiff suddenly stopped. Defendant had no knowledge of the dog in front of plain4
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tiff's car, and because of the suddenness of the stop. and
the lack of warning or signal or any intimation that an
emergency might be created defendant was unable to
avoid colliding with plaintiff, although he did apply his
brakes (R. 162-164).
Defendant denies he made any statements to plaintiff
of the nature of those quoted at the bottom of page 3 of
appellant's brief, to the effect that he had not seen ap'p;ellant's car (R. 165-166). In explaining the conversation
'Nhich did take place he said:
"As I recall we got together. I asked him why
he stopped, and he said he stop·ped for a dog. I
told him I didn't see any dog, and I couldn't see
it then. I asked him if he was hurt. He said no.
And I guess that is about all." (R. 165)
The physical facts found at the scene were testified
to by Mr. Boyd Durrant, who at the time was employed
by the City of American Fork as a police officer. He
found both vehicles in the immediate area of the accident and determined that defendant's automobile had left
16 feet of light tire marks up to the point of collision, and
that the front wheels of plaintiff's automobile left 2 feet
6 inches of brake marks (R. 153).
'Those are the facts in brief. More specific reference
to items of testimony will be quoted under the points of
argument.

STATEMENT OF POINTS·
POINT I. THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.

5
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POINT II. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT
WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION FOR
THE DETERMINATION OF THE JURY.
POINT III. IF DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT PER
SE, ANY POSSIBLE ERROR WAS CURED BY THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.
POINT IV. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND THE
VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT MUST BE ·CONSIDERED
FROM 'THE STANDPOINT MOST FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE, CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.

App·ellant's argument that h·e was free from negligence ignores his own testimony, which shows he had
ample advance warning that he might have to stop at any
moment. Plaintiff admitted that he gave no signal of
the imminence of danger or his intention to stop, yet he
knew from the time he left a position west of the west
crosswalk until the collision (a distance of approximately
130 feet (R.. 107) ) that he might at any time be required
to stop:. Nevertheless, he continued to accelerate his
car until he jammed on his brakes. We quote a portion
of his testimony from the record:
"Q. Before you came to a stop for the dog you
had your foot on the accelerator; is that correct~

A.

That is possible.

Q. Did you so

testify~

6
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A.

Q.
A.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

That is what I testified to, yes.
* * * *
Well, that's correct, is it not~
That's correct. (R. 109)
* * * *
And you took your foot from the accelerator
and put it on the brake, didn't you, when that
dog stopped~
That's correct.
Now, during the time from where you stopped
for the light until you stopped your car for
the dog, that was running out in front of you,
was it~
He was running along.
And you were antic~pating all the time you
might have to stop for that dog?
That's right·

Q. Your left front window was up, wasn't it,
closed~

A.

Well, it was closed after we looked at it after
the accident.

Q. You at no time made any arm signal out of
your left window~
A.

Well if the window was closed, I am positive
I didn't roll the window up after the accident.
(R. 110)

Q. You are positive you didn't make an arm signal, aren't you~
A.

If the window was up I didn't make an arm
signal.

• • • •

Q.

Were you watching your speedometer also'

7
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A. No, I wasn't.
·Q.

But you did anticipate you might have to stop
for that dog at any time during that distance~

That's correct. (R. 111)
* * * •
Q. I mean from the time you first saw it until
the time of the accident it was in front of
your car~
A. That's right.
Q. How_far was it, how far was the dog in front
of your car when you ap·plied brakes to stop~
A.

A.

About three feet I would judge.

Q.

You stopped practically instantly

A.

I came right up to a stop, yes.

Q.

In p·ractically an instant's time or second's

then~

• • • •

·time you had to stop when the dog stop,ped ~
Well, I was concentrating on stopping if the
dog stop·ped, yes, for one hundred thirty feet ..
(R. 112)
* * * *
A. I was traveling ap·proximately one hundred
thirty feet that I was watching the rear-view
mirror and the dog." (R.l13).
A.

When viewed simply, the situation presented is one
in which the forward driver, the plaintiff, knowing the
presence of an imminent danger and who kilew, or in the
exercise of due care should have known of the presence
of a vehicle directly behind him in close proximity, nevertheless traveled a dietance of some 130 feet through and
beyond an intersection without giving any warning to
8
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those behind hhn whose safety might be endangered,
and then suddenly stopped without any signal or warning
\Vhatsoever. The lead car driving ahead when the light
changed to green was an indication to cars following
that plaintiff intended to go on. Clearly such conduct
is negligent. The statutory rule governing the conduct
in question of the plaintiff is contained in 41-6-69 (c)
Utah Code Anrnotated 1953, as follows:
"No person shall stop or suddenly decrease
the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein
to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the
rear when there is an opportunity to give such
signal."
A principle of law which is particularly applicable
to the statute quoted and the facts as outlined herein is
contained in BZ.as·hfield's Cyc. of Automobile Law and
P·ractice Vol. 1, Section 706:
"The driver of a motor vehicle, which obscures the vision along the public highway to such
an extent as to prevent persons following him
from observing conditions which ought to be
knovvn to them to insure their safety, is under
an obligation to use a reasonable degree of care
that warning be given of approaching danger to
those whose view of the impending peril he obstructs. * * *"
A case vvherein a statute identical to the Utah la'v
and the citation just quoted are construed is Strimple v.
0. K. Warehouse Co., (l(an.) 98 Pa.c. (2) 169. In that
action the plaintiff vvas a guest in a vehicle operated by
her daughter. An employee of defendant \Vas operating
9
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a large moving van, which plaintiff's daughter had followed for some miles. At the entrance to the intersection
where the accident occurred there was a slow sign at the
'
side of the road, which plaintiff's
daughter was unable
to see because her vision was obscured by the size of the
truck. ·The truck driver suddenly slowed his vehicle
or stopped in response to that sign, but plaintiff's daughter was unable to avoid colliding with the rear end of
the truck. There was a dispute in the evidence as to
whether the truck driver signaled his intention to stop
or slow down.
A general verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff. In addition certain jnterrogatories were answered
by the jury. Defendants app·ealed, assigning certain
errors. In discussing one assignment, namely defendants' demurrer to the evidence, the court said:
"From an examination of these sections and
the evidence of the driver of this car, it appears
that the jury would have been warranted in finding th.at the driver of the truck violated Section 47
(c) ('No p·erson shall stop or suddenly decrease
the sp~eed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein
to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the
rear when there is an opportunity to give such
signal.') in that he stopped his truck suddenly
without giving any appropriate signal. The rule
in point in a situation such as this is stated in 1
Blashfield Cyc. of Automobile La'v and Practice,
Perm. Ed., Sec. 706 as follo,vs: 'The driver of a
motor vehicle, which obscures the vision along
the public highway to such an extent as to prevent persons following him from observing condi-

10
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tions which ought to be known to them to insure
their safety, is under an obligation to use a reasonable degree of care that warning he given of
approaching danger to those whose view of the impending peril he obstructs. * * *' There is evidence in this case that had the truck been equipped
as provided in the statute quoted, and the driver
observed due diligence, he could have given the
warning as provided in the above quotation."
In the answers to the interrogatories, the jury did not
find that the truck driver had failed to signal, and the
court, concluding that liability must be predicated on (1)
sudden stopping, and (2) failure to signal, reversed the
general verdict in the lower court on the ground that the
jury did not find that the truck driver had failed to signal.
In Union Transportat.ion Co. v. La,mb, (Okla.) 123
l:lac. (2) 660, the plaintiff was riding as a guest in a
vehicle traveling in the same direction as the defendant's
bus. The roadway concerned was one of the main arteries
of the State. The highway was straight. A cotton wagon
was directly in front of the bus, but the bus was unable
to pass because of an oncoming truck. The driver of the
car in which plaintiff was riding testified that he was
unable to see the cotton wagon and made an attempt to
pass the bus, but had to swing back to avoid oncoming
traffic just at the time the bus stopp·ed for the cotton
wagon, thus precipitating a collision between the vehicle
in which plaintiff was riding and the bus. There was
evidence that the bus driver gave no signal of intention
to stop. The case was submitted to the jury and a verdict
11
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returned in favor of plaintiff. The court held on review
of the jury's verdict:
"Upon consideration of the foregoing salient
features. of this case in the light of the law applicable thereto, we conclude that when the driver of a
motor vehicle of such a size that it obstructs the
view of the road ahead for drivers of vehicles
following him, brings his vehicle to a sudden stop
in the traffic lane of one of the p-rincipal highway~
of the State, behind a slow moving vehicle and in
front of an automobile traveling behind him, without any signal of his intention to stop, under circumstances from 'vhich the jury could reasonab]y
infer that he knevv of the presence of such automobile behind him, and that he had an1ple opportunity to slow down gradually to avoid colliding
with the vehicle in front, this court cannot hold as
a matter of law that the driver exercised due care,
and that there was an absence of proof sufficient
to establish prima facie negligence."
In the case a.t bar, both elements of liability are
p·resent, namely: (1) failure to signal, and (2) sudden
stop. Both elements were admitted by the plaintiff. In
addition, in this case, as in the Stri1nple case, supra,
the plaintiff knew that the dog 'vas directly in front of
his car; that it was in1possible for the defendant to have
been aware of the presence of the dog, because his vision
would be obscured by plaintiff's vehicle. It 'vill be remembered that the dog was running along directly in
front of plaintiff's vehicle and only two or three feet
in front of his car. This, in and of itself and irrespective
of statute, placed a duty upon plaintiff to signal the imminence of danger to the defendant, whose safety ,vould

12
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be imperiled by a sudden stop by the plaintiff.
The duty to signal arose when the dog entered his
path, not when he was suddenly forced to stop some 130
feet further down the highway. Plaintiff did not need
to move forward until the dog had cleared out of the
way. Having chosen to proceed, he had plenty of time
to give the signal, which the law required him to give.
Plain tiff seeks to excuse his failure to give a signal
on the fact that he was suddenly confronted with an
emergency necessitating an emergency stop. It was not
a sudden e1nergency as to plain tiff, because he was R\vare
of the dog and anticipated he might have to stop at any
1noment during the entire distance of 130 feet, 50 feet
beyond the intersection. Plaintiff started out fron1 a
stopped position, and it would, of course, require son1e
time and distance to accelerate to ten miles per hour or
1nore, as indicated by the officers' report. A driver in
the position of defendant, practically stopp·ed immediately behind the lead car for the semaphore light, would
normally assurne until notified to the contrary that the
lead driver intended to proceed. Appellant seeks to place
the entire burden upon the following vehicle, in this case
defendant, but the lavv places a duty on the part of both
drivers. Under circumstances where the lead driver is in
a position to see the situation and knows he might be recluired to stop at any moment, his duty to warn or signal
is increased. However, instead of taking any precaution
to warn follovving vehicles, plaintiff in this case mistakenly assumed there was no car to the rear and acceler-

13
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ated his automobile until the instant he jammed on his
brakes.
We submit that under such circumstances, whether
the plaintiff was negligent in violating his statutory duty
to signal is at least a question of fact for the determination of the jury. When he knew of the situation, as he
admittedly did, it could logically be argued that he,
plaintiff, was. negligent as a matter of law. The jury correctly found he was negligent.
In Donahrue v. Mazzoli, et al, (Cal.) 80 Pac. (2) 743,
the accident happened near the corner of Norton and
Mission Streets in San Francisco, California. The defendant, the lead driver, was driving a Dodge truck.
Plaintiff, following, was driving a Plymouth sedan. Both
were proceeding at a speed of about 18 miles per hour.
As they crossed the intersection, they slowed down to
about 14 miles per hour. Having crossed the intersection,
each increased his speed to about 18 miles per hour and
continued forward. Plaintiff had been foilowing the defendant at a distance of about 15 or 16 feet. A short distance beyond the intersection, the Dodge truck turned
slightly to the right and stop·ped. Plaintiff was unable
to avoid colliding with the rear end of the truck. There
was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the defendant
had given a signal. The jury's verdict below was in favor
of the plaintiff and defendants appealed. The court held:
"Cases involving rear end collisions are many.
Prima facie each case imports negligence and
explanations are in order. Many different ~itua
tions are presented, and in each specific case due
consideration becomes necessary to ascertain 'each

14
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pertinent circumstance, and then give it due consi'deration. Although the contention has often
been made that the leader alone was guilty of
negligence or tha.t the follower alone was guilty
of negligence, in general it has been held that the
case as made by each party presented a question
of fact for the jury and was not solely a question
of law for the court."

Denver Tra1nway Corporation v. Burke, (Colo.) 28
Pac. (2) 253. Plaintiff brought this action for injuries
sustained in a rear-end collision with a bus. We quote
from the C·ourt's opinion:
"There is evidence which justified the jury
in believing: That the bus was stopped practically
in the center of the street; that plaintiff could not
see around it nor pass it without encroaching on
the left side of the road; that the bus stopped at
least nine feet from the curb; that between it and
the curb workmen were cleaning the gutter, and it
required three or four feet to clear them; that the
bus carried a rear 'stop' red light on each side;
that the bus stopped suddenly without any evidence of its intention so to do, or indication that
it n1ight unless it vvere the disputed flashing of its
rear lights; that plaintiff, not knowing that the
bus would stop, started to pa.ss it, and by reason
of her want of knovvledge and the sudden stopping
of the bus collided with it. * * * Plaintiff repeatedly testified that she was looking, could have seen
the stop lights had there been any, an'd did not see
them. She was not asked if she could say positively that there were no such lights. I-Iovvever,
in ansvver to the question :X~ * * 'Did you see it
(the bus) in the act of coming to a stop~ She anS\vered: "I saw it in the street, but I did not kno\v
it \Vas going to co1ne to a stop. ~rhere was no sig-
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nal whatever." ' There is nothing negative about
that evidence. It could not be more p-ositive. It
was never withdrawn nor weakened by explanation, and it was a part of plaintiff's case in chief.
Under any theory of other evidence it presented
a clear question of fact on conflicting testin1ony
and that question was for the jurors. It sent contributory negligence, as well as negligence, to then1
for final decision.
"Ordinarily a driver who collides with a car
ahead of him, going in the same direction, is negligent but not always so. Surrounding facts and
circumstances are always relevant and material
and may throw an entirely different light on the
question. Perhaps the strongest case relied on by
the tramway, and on which rests its requested instruction No. 4 is Sniffen v. Huschle, et al, 121
Misc. 58, 200 N.Y.S·. 206; but it is not in point.
There the first vehicle stopped to avoid striking
a child who had run in front of it. 'This was as
mucli a warning to the second car as the first.
But see Greenberg v. Robertson Stelling Corp.,
222 Ap·p. Div. 21, 225 N.Y.S. 829, which appears
to overrule the Sniffen case."

Miller et al v. Minneapoli-s Street Railway, et al,
(Minn.) 59 N.W. (2) 923. Plaintiff, shortly after passing
an intersection, stopped to make a left turn into an alleyway. He did not signal his intention to turn. He was
struck from the rear by a street car. At the close of the
evidence, plaintiff movPrl for a directed verdict. The
court held:
"The motion was properly denied. From a review of th·e evidence the negligence of defendants
at most was a question for the jury. * * * From
a review of the evidence presented, there appears
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to be ample evidence of ne_gligence on the part of
plaintiff, Vernon Miller, the driver of the automobile. There was testimony that, after passing,
Miller pulled in front of the street car an:d stopped
without giving any left-turn signal. His contributory negligence was a question for th·e jury."
The jury was entitled to consider whether defendant
might have slowed or stopped or lengthened the distance
between the two cars had he received any signal or warnIng. vVe quote a portion of defendant's testimony:
"Q.

Had you at any time seen a dog in that vicinity~

A.

No.

Q. If there was one it was out of your vision f
A. Yes.

Q. At any time had you looked at the clock that
reference has been made to up there~
A.

Yes.

Q. When did you look at the clock~
A.

Before I crossed the 'vest pedestrian lane.
(R. 163)
* * * *
Q. Then where was your attention from then on~
A. On the car in front of me.

Q. Now could you see whether or not Mr. Sturdavant, who was driving the CadillHc, whether
or not he made any arm signal or signal to
slow down to stop~
A. I never seen it.
Q. Were you in a position to see if he hud put
his arm out~
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A. Yes.
Q. And was there any?

A. No.
Q. Did you see any reason at all why he should
have come to this stop there'
A.

No, I didn't. (R. 164)

Q.

Did you know he was going to stop'

A.

No." (R. 165)

Then on cross-examination he testified:
"Q. Mr. C-o~gton, after you had started through
this intersection and after Mr. Sturdavant
haJd started up from his stopped position,
did you continue to drive along at such speed
that you thought you could stop short of impact were he to stop?

A. If I had knowed he w·as going to stop, yes.
Q.

Did you continue to watch ahead of you as
you traveled down to the point of impact?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you continue to watch the Cadillac car at
all times?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you do everything you could?
A. Yes." (R. 174)
Again we repeat that when plaintiff knew he might
be required to stop, and defendant had no such knowledge, a timely signal or warning would have been seen
and heeded by defendant. At lea.st the jury could have
so found.
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In Fl,ipp·en v. Millwa.rd, (Utah) 234 Pac. (2) 1053,
the accident was a rear-end collision at the intersection
just north of the main intersection in Layton, Utah.
rl,he accident occurred in the morning on a very foggy
day. There was evidence from which a jury could believe
that plaintiff had stopped or suddenly slowed her vehicle
without signalling. Plaintiff, appellant, contended that
there was no such evidence and that the lower court committed prejudicial error in instructing in substance that
plaintiff was required to give a signal of her intention
to stop or slow down. The court held:
"From the· evidence we have outlined above a
jury could have reasonably found that if both appellant's and respondent's testimony were true
as to the rate of speed their cars were traveling
prior to the accident that the accident could not
have occurred unless appellant had either suddenly stopped or suddenly decreased her speed.
* * * Both from the oral testimony as to the
speed the cars were traveling and the testimony
from which a jury could have reasonably believed
that appellant's car came to rest approximately
12 to 15 feet directly in front of respondent's car
after the impact, and from the additional fact that
appellant had to cross a culvert into a rather
narro-vv street in a dense fog to reach her destination, a jury could have reasonably found that she
had suddenly decreased her speed without giving
an appropriate signal and that this contributed to
the accident. The court, therefore, did not err
-vvhen it gave the instruction."
The case at bar presents an even stronger situation
than the Flippen case, for the proposition that the failure to signal contributed to the accident.
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In Marley v. Wichita Tra;ns. Corp., (Kan.) 96 Pac.
(2) 877, plaintiff brought an action for injuries received
while she was riding as a passenger in a taxi cab which
was struck from the rear by a b·US. The evidence was
conflicting. Plaintiff's evidence indicated that the cab
pulled up at an intersection to stop for a red light and
had been stop·ped for a few seconds when struck in the
rear. The bus company's evidence showed that the cab
cut in front of th·e bus and stop·ped suddenly without
signalling a distance of 150 feet from the intersection.
The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff.
Interrogatories were also answered, which supported
the defendant's theory. On motion of the defendant, judgment was accordingly entered for defendant.
On appeal by the plaintiff, the court held:
"As heretofore indicated, our examination of
the evidence leads to the conclusion that either
the plaintiff's or the defendant's version of what
happened must be accepted. By the answers to
special questions 1 to 4, inclusive, the jury found
the defendant's version to be correct. So considered there was one and only one direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and under
the answer to question 7 that cause was the manner in which the. taxicab was driven and not any
negligence of the defendant."
We resp~ectfully submit that the issues of negligence
and contributory negligence were properly submitted to
the jury under the court's instructions and rightly deeided by the jury.
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POINT II.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY
OF NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION FOR. THE DETERMINATION OF THE JURY.

This question has been substantially covered under
respondent's first point and reference heretofore made
to the testimony of both parties. Appellant claims that if
defendant had "been back a little distance" the collision
would not have occurred. In this regard, if plaintiff had
given a signal or warning, defendant would have slowed
or stopped, and in consequence been a greater distance
back. To the contrary, he was induced to believe that
plaintiff was in the clear and was in fact proceeding
ahead.
Some of the questions propounded by plaintiff's coun3el to defendant (set forth in appellant's brief) were objectionable, and objections made, as calling for conclusions and faile:d to take in to consideration the matter of
plaintiff's failure to give any signal or warning (R. 173).
rrhese questions were not only ilnproper as invading the
province of the jury, but were misleading to the witness.
On re-direct examination, defendant \Vas asked and he
answered as follows :
"Now ~{r. Black questioned you about how
far you \Vere back fro1n this car ahead of you
and whether you could have stopped under certain
conditions. Now, if there had been a hand signal
used by Mr. Sturdavant signalling he was going
to stop, were you far enough back of hirn that you
could have stopped within time if you had received
such a signal for a substantial distance 1

A.

Yes.

01
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Q.

You say you could have stopped in time~

A. Yes." (R. 176)
He had previously testified on cross-examination as follows:
"Mr. Covington, after you had started
through this intersection, and after Mr. Sturdavant had started up from his stopped position, did
you continue to drive along at such speed that you
thought you could stop short of impact with hiln
were he to stop~
A.

If I had known he was going to stop, yes.

Q.

Did you continue to watch ahead of you as
you traveled down to the point of impact~

A.

Yes." (R. 174).

In Wallac·h v. Lig·htning Electric Co., (N.J.) 161
Atl. 680, defendant Dunham was driving a vehicle owned
by the defendant, Lightning Electric Company. Dunham
testified that he was following plaintiff's vehicle at a distance of about 8 or 9 feet at 20 miles per hour, and that
plaintiff's car stop·p•ed "very short" at a cross street.
There was no proof of traffic conditions or that plaintiff gave a signal of his intention to stop. The· only explanation given by defendant was that plaintiff suddenly
stopped, and that defendant "could not stop as good as
he could." The lower court directed a verdict for plaintiff. On appeal by defendants, the court held:
"It is quite likely that the jury would have
found negligence as a fact on the part of defendants. But we are unable to say, and we think that
the court below erred in holding, that there was
negligence as a matter of law. The mere fact that
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a vehicle is moving in close proximity to a vehicle
moving ahead and keeping up with it, does not of
itself constitute negligent conduct per se. Jackson
v. Geiger, 100 N.J. Law, 330, 126 A. 438, Simpson
v. Snellenburg, 96 N.J. Law 518, 115· A. 403, 24
A.L.R. 503, Goolsby v. Public Service Co. Transport, 157 A. 124, 9 N. J. Misc. 1158.
"The case should have gone to the jury on the
question of liability."
See also Donahue v. Mazzoli, et al·, (Cal.) 80 Pac.
(2) 743; Denver Tramw·ay Corp. v. Burke, (Colo.) 28
Pac. (2) 253; and Flippen v. Millw·ard (Utah) 234 Pac.
(2) 1053, supra, and other cases heretofore discussed.
In the Flippen case, the following instruction was
held to be proper:
"You are instructed that no person shall suddenly decrease speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal which would indicate
to a driver immediately to the rear that said vehicle \Vas going to decrease its sp·eed; and if you
find by a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff suddenly decreased her speed upon said
highway without giving a signal that could be seen
and observed by a driver in the rear and that her
failure to give such signal in sufficient time to
warn defendant caused or contributed to the accident and tlie resulting injuries, if any, then your
verdict shall be in favor of defendant on plaintiffs' cornplaint, no cause of action."
POINT III.
IF DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT PER SE, ANY POSSIBLE ERROR WAS CURED BY THE VERDICT OF THE
JURY.
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We have heretofore pointed out that the jury in returning the verdict in favor of plaintiff on defendant's
counterclaim ap·parently found that both parties were
guilty of negligence or contributing negligence. Therefore, even if it should be assumed that defendant was
negligent as a matter of law (and respondent contends
that he was not), the error, if any, was cured by the
verdict.
C.J.S. Vol. 5, App1eal OIYIAd Error, Sec. 1758:
"Any error committed by the trial court in
p·assing on a mot~on for a directed verdict is not
a gro111Y1Ad for revers!al wnless, undler the circun~
stOJnC:es it w~as p·rejudicial. * * *

"Erroneous refusal to direct. In respect of
an erroneous refusal to direct a verdict, it has
. been held that the error is not prejudicial where
the jury found correctly; where the verdict is for
the p•arty making the motion; * * *"
In Pierce v. Isabel, et at, (Ohio) 36 N.E. (2) 64, the
court said and held :
"We have no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the trial court should have directed a
verdict in favor of defendant, Constant A. Isabel,
at the close of plaintiff's testimony, but the verdict of the jury cured this failure to comply with
. proper procedure."
S·ee also Sharp· v. Faulkner, (Ky.) 166 s. w. (2) 62.
Likewise in the instant case, when the· jury apparently found that both p·arties were guilty of negligence,
and by that finding returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim, any possible error on
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behalf of the lower court in submitting the issue of defendant's negligence to the jury could not be prejudicial
to plain tiff.
POINT IV.
THE EVIDEN·CE AND VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT
MUST BE CONSIDERED FROM THE STANDPOINT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT.

The general rule of law concerning the presumptions
vvhich favor sustaining a general jury verdict is contained in 3 Am. Jur. pg. 513 (Appeal arnd Error) :
"The presumptions which will be indulged
with respect to the verdict of a jury are, in general, those which tend to sustain its validity.
Every reasonable presumption exists in favor of
a general verdict."
The evidence in this case, and all reasonable inferences to he drawn therefrom in favor of the defendant
support the finding of the jury that the negligence of the
plaintiff proximately caused or proximately contributed
to the accident, and the verdict for defendant based on
that evidence should be sustained.

CONCLUSION
It is frequently said that each case must be decided
on its own particular facts and circumstances. As to
when an issue should he withdrawn from the jury, this
court recently stated in Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc. (Utah)
249 Pac. (2) 213, at page 215, that "matters of negligence,
contributory negligence and proxiinate cause generally
are jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts are of
such conclusive character as to require all reasonable

25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

minds to con-clude that the ultimate fact of negligence,
contributory negligence or proximate cause does or does
not exist."
In the instant case, it is without disp,ute that plaintiff
was tlie one with knowledge of the situation and the one
obligated to warn the following vehicles of the approachi,ng danger. During the entire distance, he anticipated
he might have to stop at any moment. It is equally without dispute that plaintiff came to a sudden and abrupt
stop and gave rio signal or warning of his intention to so
do.
We respiectfully submit that the issues were rightly
submitted to the jury and that the verdict should be sustained.
Respe:ctfnlly submitted,
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant and
R:esponden.t
520 Continental_Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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